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Abstract
We propose a simple model of the banking system incorporating a game feature
where the evolution of monetary reserve is modeled as a system of coupled Feller diffu-
sions. The Markov Nash equilibrium generated through minimizing the linear quadratic
cost subject to Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type processes creates liquidity and deposit rate. The
adding liquidity leads to a flocking effect but the deposit rate diminishes the growth
rate of the total monetary reserve causing a large number of bank defaults. In addition,
the corresponding Mean Field Game and the infinite time horizon stochastic game with
the discount factor are also discussed.
Keywords: Feller diffusion, systemic risk, inter-bank borrowing and lending system,
stochastic game, Nash equilibrium, Mean Field Game.
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis motivates the research on systemic risk. Central to this research is
constructing a safe banking system that alerts investors to possible systemic risk and tackle
a financial crisis should it occur. However, due to the complexity of connection between
banks, systemic risk is often unpredictable and unmeasurable. Hence, in order to better
understand the banking system and systemic risk, we propose a model of interbank lending
and borrowing with a game feature where the evolution of monetary reserve is driven by a
system of interacting Feller diffusions and the default is simply defined as the zero monetary
reserve as studied by Fouque and Ichiba [2013]. Each bank controls its own rate of lending
to or borrowing from the central bank to minimize its cost or maximize its profit. The
spirit of optimal strategy with respect to the object function is that each bank intends to
borrow when its monetary value falls below a critical level (the averaged capitalization) and
to lend when its monetary value remains above the critical level. Intuitively, banks intend
to maximize their borrowing or lending activities during a fixed period. Hence, referring to
Carmona et al. [2015], we restrict the monetary amount that banks borrow from or lend to
a central bank at the fixed incentive rate determined by individual banks or a regulator.
To this end, we apply a quadratic cost function. The exact Markov Nash equilibrium for a
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linear quadratic regulator in the both finite and infinite time horizon and subject to Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) type processes is obtained by a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations. In addition, we solve for ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the mean field limit using the
coupled backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the forward Kolmogorov
equation for the value function and distribution of dynamics. Given the feature of CIR type
processes, the admissibility of the equilibrium is worth to be discussed. From a financial
perspective, compared to case of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) type processes proposed in
Carmona et al. [2015], due to the volatility driven by the squared root function of states,
the Markov Nash equilibrium generated by CIR type processes creates not only liquidity
but deposit rate impairing the growth rate leading to the system instability such that a
regulator must govern the growth rate by controlling the corresponding lending/borrowing
incentive to prevent system crash.
Such interactions leading to multiple defaults is investigated by other mathematical
models in continuous time. Fouque and Sun [2013], Carmona et al. [2015] comment on sys-
temic risk using the interacting OU type processes. Garnier et al. [2013a,b] study the rare
events in the potential bistable model based on large deviation results. Mean Field Games
(MFGs) proposed by Lasry and Lions [2006a,b, 2007] are applied frequently to obtain the
asymptotic equilibria called ǫ-Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with inter-
actions given by empirical distributions whose solution satisfies the strongly coupled HJB
equations backward in time and the Kolmogorov equations forward in time. Independently,
Caines, Huang, and Malhame´ develop a similar scenario called the Nash Certainty equiv-
alence. See Huang et al. [2006, 2007] for instance. Instead of the partial differential equa-
tion (PDE) approach, Bensoussan et al. [2016], Carmona et al. [2013], Carmona and Lacker
[2015] consider the probabilistic approach using appropriate forms of adjoint forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) to solve ǫ-Nash equilibria satisfying
the Pontryagin stochastic minimum principle. In particular, Lacker and Webster [2015],
Lacker [2016] study MFGs with common noise. Due to the volatility in Feller diffusions
driven by the square-root function of states, the sufficient Pontryagin minimum principle
is not straightforward to be applied. Hence, we tackle the optimization problem using the
HJB approach.
Consider N banks that lend to and borrow from each other. Their monetary reserves are
represented by a system of diffusion processes Xit for i = 1, · · · , N driven by N independent
standard Brownian motions W it , i = 1, · · · , N . The initial values of the system may be
nonnegative squared integrable and identically distributed random variables Xi0 = ξ
i for
i = 1, · · · , N independent of the Brownian motions. The model is written as
dXit =
 a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) + γt
 dt+ αitdt+ 2√XitdW it , i = 1, · · · , N, (1)
where the nonnegative growth rate or income rate γt for the individual bank is a determin-
istic function in L∞ space and the lending preference, or rate of lending and borrowing is
normalized by the number of banks with 0 ≤ a ≤ N . Referring to Fouque and Ichiba [2013],
we further assume the diffusion parameter equal to 2 identical to squared Bessel processes
in order to simplify the analysis of system stability.
The drift terms represent interactions between the banks; specifically they define the
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borrowing or lending rate of bank i from or to bank j. The simple lending and borrowing
can be rewritten in the mean field form as
dXit =
(
a(X t −Xit) + γt + αit
)
dt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N, (2)
whereXt =
1
N
∑N
j=1X
j
t represents the averaged capitalization whereby bank i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
chooses its own optimization strategy αi for optimizing its lending and borrowing rates
to/from the central bank at initial time by minimizing the quadratic cost
J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(X
i
T )
}
, (3)
where X = (X1, · · · ,XN ), x = (x1, · · · , xN ), α = (α1, · · · , αN ). Note that α· is a progres-
sively measurable control process and αi· is admissible if for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
Xj,α
i
t ≥ 0, ∀j 6= i and Xi,α
i
t ≥ 0 a.s.. (4)
The running cost and the terminal cost are defined as
fi(Xt, α
i
t) =
(αit)
2
2
− qαit(X t −Xit) +
ǫ
2
(X t −Xit)2,
and
gi(XT ) =
c
2
(
XT −XiT
)2
,
where q, c, and ǫ are positive parameters and q2 ≤ ǫ in order to satisfy the convexity
condition of the running cost fi(x, α). Note that q controls the borrowing and lending
incentive and the case of Xit ≤ Xt gives αit ≥ 0 denoting that bank i intends to borrow.
Conversely, when Xit > Xt, the negative strategy α
i
t < 0 implies a lending intention by
bank i. In addition, ǫ and c are treated as the parameters for the running penalty and the
terminal penalty respectively implying that banks intends to hold their own reserves close
to the average capitalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the simple
uncontrolled constant growth rate of interbank lending and borrowing. The behavior of
the system is studied using the results of Fouque and Ichiba [2013]. Section 3 is devoted
to solving the Markov Nash equilibria of the stochastic differential games and the ǫ-Nash
equilibria in the mean field limit. We implement the coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations in Markovian models. The financial implication is illustrated at the end of this
section. The infinite time horizon with the discount factor and its influence on the system
crash and multiple defaults are analyzed in Section 4. The conclusion is provided in Section
5 and the verification theorems for both finite and infinite time horizons are given in the
appendix.
2 Interbank Lending System
In this section, we discuss the simple model of lending and borrowing without controls. In
this model, bank i has a monetary reserve Xit with a constant growth rate γ written as
dXit =
 a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) + γ
 dt+ 2√XitdW it , i = 1, · · · , N, (5)
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where the lending preference is a fixed normalized constant aN ≤ 1 treated as one particular
case in Fouque and Ichiba [2013]. Consequently, the total monetary reserve Yt =
∑N
i=1X
i
t
is given by
dYt = Nγdt+ 2
√
YtdW˜t (6)
where W˜t is a standard Brownian motion in some extension probability space by Le´vy
theorem referring to Theorem 3.4.2 of Karatzas and Shreve [1998]. We straightforwardly
apply the results of Fouque and Ichiba [2013] (See also Chapter 6 of Jeanblanc et al. [2009]
for instance) as follows:
• System crash
1. If γ > 2N , systemic risk never happens owing to the total monetary reserve Y
never reaching zero:
P(Yt > 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞)) = 1. (7)
2. If γ = 2N , we obtain
P(lim sup
t→∞
Yt =∞) = 1, (8)
and the system survivals since the total reserve X remains positive . However,
due to
P( inf
0≤t≤∞
Yt = 0) = 1, (9)
the shrinking of the total reserve to almost nothing leads to a financial crisis at
some point in the future almost surely.
3. If 0 < γ < 2N , the total monetary reserve Y violates the property (8) but
satisfies property (9). Under this condition, the total monetary reserve Y reaches
zero almost surely at some large time and reflects instantaneously at that point.
Therefore, all banks face defaults in the future
4. If γ = 0, the total monetary reserve Y approaches to zero within some finite
time. At this time, all banks default at some time and thereafter remain at zero
almost surely.
• Given a identical growth rate γ and a symmetric lending preference a/N , the stochastic
stability of the process Xit −Xt for all t ≥ 0 is guaranteed, Under this condition, the
matrix-valued process (Xit −Xjt )1≤i,j≤N is also stochastically stable using Proposition
2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013].
Here, we apply the Euler scheme to plot a typical realization of N = 10 trajectories of
(5) up to time T = 100 with a time step ∆ = 10−4 and a fixed at 10. The growth rate γ is
varied as 0.2 and 0 in Figure 1 and as 2 and 0 in Figure 2. Note that the trajectories are
grouped by the mean reverting rate a = 10. This flocking behavior leads to stability at the
larger growth rate creates stability but systemic risk at the smaller growth rate. Figure 1
shows that due to γ = 0.2, the growth rate of total monetary reserve Yt is 2 satisfying the
4
Figure 1: One realization of N = 10 trajectories of (5) with γ = 0.2 (left plot) and with
γ = 0 (right plot). The common mean-reverting rate a is fixed at 10.
Figure 2: One realization of N = 10 trajectories of (5) with γ = 2 (left plot) and with γ = 0
(right plot). The common mean-reverting rate a is fixed at 10.
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condition (9) so that we observe the shrinking scenario in the sense that Yt becomes small
in this particular realization. The monetary reserve Xit can be rewritten as
dXit =
 a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) + γ
 dt+ 2√XitdW it
=
(
a(X t −Xit) + γ
)
+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N,
where Xit is mean-reverting at the averaged capitalization
1
N Yt. The previous discussion
implies that lending and borrowing behaviors create stability when γ > 2N but incur systemic
risk when 0 ≤ γ ≤ 2N .
In addition, similarly to the model in Carmona et al. [2015], the number of banksN plays
an important role in the system. In coupled OU processes, a large N mitigates systemic
risk since the probability of the leading averaged capitalization reaching the default barrier
(i.e. entering a systemic event) decays with order
√
N . The systemic event triggering a
system crash occurs independently of the mean-reverting rate a. On the other hand, in
interacting Feller diffusions, the system crash occurs through the total monetary reserve of
the interacting Feller diffusions driven by Nγ. The probability of all defaults diminishes
meaning that the survival probability of the system increases under a strong growth rate
γ and a large N . Note that this probability is independent of the lending preference a/N .
Hence, in the case of the coupled system with an identical lending preference, for the propose
of preventing systemic risk or multiple defaults, a regulator must expend the number of
individuals and encourage lending and borrowing behavior.
3 Construction of Nash Equilibria
We now return to the model with a game feature proposed in Section 1. The monetary
reserve of bank i is written as
dXit =
(
a(X t −Xit) + γt
)
dt+ αitdt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N, (10)
where the growth rate nonnegative γt is a deterministic function in L∞ space and the initial
value Xi0 = ξ
i may be a nonnegative square-integrable and identically distributed random
variable independent of Brownian motions. Each bank attempts to minimize
E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(X
i
T )
}
, (11)
where X = (X1, · · · ,XN ), x = (x1, · · · , xN ), α = (α1, · · · , αN ) and
fi(Xt, α
i
t) =
(αit)
2
2
− qαit(X t −Xit) +
ǫ
2
(X t −Xit)2,
and q2 ≤ ǫ ensuring that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α) and
gi(XT ) =
c
2
(
XT −XiT
)2
.
6
3.1 HJB Approach
Referring to the discussion in Chapter 5 of Carmona [2016], in the Markovian setting, the
Markov Nash equilibrium can be explicitly solved via the HJB equations. As banks intend
to minimize their costs, given the optimal strategies αˆj for j 6= i with the corresponding
trajectories Xˆ−i = (Xˆ1, · · · , Xˆi−1, Xˆi+1, · · · , XˆN ), the value function of bank i is written
as
V i(t, x) = inf
αi∈Ai
Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi(X
i
s, Xˆ
−i
s , α
i
s)ds+ gi(X
i
T , Xˆ
−i
T )
}
. (12)
Hence, the HJB equation for solving for the Markov Nash equilibrium suggested by the
dynamic programming principle reads
∂tV
i + inf
αi
{∑
j 6=i
(
a(x− xj) + γt + αˆj(t, x)
)
∂xjV
i +
(
a(x− xi) + γt + αi
)
∂xiV
i
+ 2
N∑
j=1
xj∂xjxjV
i +
(αi)2
2
− qαi (x− xi)+ ǫ
2
(x− xi)2
}
= 0, (13)
with the terminal condition V i(T, x) = c2(x−xi)2. Here, αˆj for all j 6= i denote the optimal
strategies of bank j for all j 6= i. We minimize (13) with respect to αi leading to the
resulting strategy for player i
αˆi = qi(x− xi)− ∂xiV i. (14)
Inserting the optimal strategy candidate (14) into the HJB equation (13), (13) becomes
∂tV
i +
N∑
j=1
(
(a+ q)(x− xj)− ∂xjV j + γt
)
∂xjV
i + 2
N∑
j=1
xj∂xjxjV
i
+
(∂xiV
i)2
2
+
(ǫ− q2)
2
(x− xi)2 = 0. (15)
We now make the following ansatz for V i
V i(t, x) =
ηct
2
(x− xi)2 + Lct(x− xi) + φctx+ µct , (16)
where ηct , L
c
t , φ
c
t and µ
c
t are deterministic functions. Inserting (16) into (13) and identifying
the terms (x − xi)2, (x − xi), x, and the state-independent terms, we obtain a system of
ordinary differential equations written as
η˙ct = 2(a+ q)η
c
t + (1−
1
N2
)(ηct )
2 − (ǫ− q2),
L˙ct =
(
a+ q +
1
N
(1− 1
N
)ηct
)
Lct +
1
N
(1− 1
N
)ηctφ
c
t + 2(1−
2
N
)ηct ,
φ˙ct = −2(1−
1
N
)ηct ,
µ˙ct =
1
N
(1− 1
2N
)(φct)
2 − 1
2
(1− 1
N
)2(Lct)
2 − (1− 1
N
)2Lctφ
c
t − γtφct ,
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with terminal conditions ηcT = c, L
c
T = 0, φ
c
T = 0, and µ
c
T = 0. Solving this system, we get
ηct =
−(ǫ− q2)
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
− c
(
δ+e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − δ−
)
(
δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)− c(1− 1N2 ) (e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1) , (17)
where we use the notation
δ± = −(a+ q)±
√
R, (18)
with
R := (a+ q)2 +
(
1− 1
N2
)
(ǫ− q2) > 0, (19)
Lct =
∫ T
t
e
∫ t
s (a+q+
1
N
(1− 1
N
)ηcu)du
(
1
N
(
1
N
− 1)ηcsφcs + 2(
2
N
− 1)ηcs
)
ds, (20)
φct =
∫ T
t
2(1− 1
N
)ηcsds, (21)
and
µct = −
∫ T
t
{
1
N
(1− 1
2N
)(φcs)
2 − 1
2
(1− 1
N
)2(Lcs)
2 − (1− 1
N
)2Lcsφ
c
s − γsφcs
}
ds. (22)
Observe that ηt is well defined for any t ≤ T given by the negative denominator of (17)
−
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) + 1
)√
R−
(
a+ q + c
(
1− 1
N2
))(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
< 0,
owing to δ+ − δ− = 2√R > 0 studied in Carmona et al. [2015]. Therefore, using (16), the
corresponding optimal strategy for bank i is written as
αˆit =
(
q + (1− 1
N
)ηct
)
(X t −Xit)− ψct , (23)
which is also the Markov Nash equilibrium. We write the corresponding dynamic Xit for
i = 1, · · · , N as
dXit =
{(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηct
)
(X t −Xit) + γt − ψct
}
dt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t , (24)
where ψct = (
1
N − 1)Lct + 1N φct ≥ 0 expresses the deposit rate. Consequently, the total
monetary reserve Yt =
∑N
i=1X
i
t is obtained as
dYt = N(γt − ψct )dt+ 2
√
YtdW˜t, (25)
with a standard Brownian motion W˜t in some extension probability space. In order to satisfy
the regularity condition of (25) and guarantee the admissibility of αˆi for i = 1, · · · , N , we
further assume
γt ≥ ψct (26)
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and
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηct ≤ N, (27)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T leading to the drift coefficient ofX bounded below by γt−ψct ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Based on Proposition 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013], the existence and uniqueness of the
weak solution toXi for i = 1, · · · , N given by (24) in the positive polyhedral domain [0,∞)N
can be obtained. Hence, we verify the admissibility of the Markov Nash equilibrium αˆi for
i = 1, · · · , N .
The financial interpretation of the assumption (26) is that banks are forbidden from leav-
ing more deposits than their monetary growth through an appropriate incentive q imposed
by a regulator. The condition (27) mentions that the number of banks in the interbank
lending system is large enough. In order to verify that V i given by (16) is the value func-
tion and the corresponding optimal strategy is αˆi written as (23), we study the verification
theorem given by Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
Below, we study the ǫ-Nash equilibria and defer the financial implications to Section
3.3.
3.2 ǫ-Nash Equilibria: Mean Field Games
In MFGs, we solve the ǫ-Nash equilibria in the mean field limit N → ∞. According to
the steps in Carmona et al. [2015], we first fix (mt)t≥0 as a candidate for the limit Xt as
N →∞
mt = lim
N→∞
X t, (28)
and solve the one-player standard control problem
V m(t, x) = inf
αt
Et,x
{∫ T
0
[
α2t
2
− qαt(mt −Xt) + ǫ
2
(mt −Xt)2
]
dt+
c
2
(mT −XT )2
}
, (29)
subject to
dXt =
(
a(mt −Xt) + γt
)
dt+ αtdt+ 2
√
XtdWt, (30)
with the nonnegative deterministic growth rate γt in L∞ space where Wt is a standard
Brownian motion independent of the initial value X0 = ξ which may be a nonnegative
square integrable random variable. Finally, we obtain mt such that mt = E[Xt] for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T . Given the candidate mt, the corresponding HJB equation to the problem
(29-30) is written as
∂tV
m+inf
α
{
(a(mt − x) + γt + α) ∂xV m+2x∂xxV m+ α
2
2
− qα(mt−x)+ ǫ
2
(mt−x)2
}
= 0.
(31)
The first order condition leads to optimal strategy given by
αˆt = q(mt −Xt)− ∂xV m. (32)
Plugging (32) into (31) implying
∂tV
m+((a+ q)(mt − x)− ∂xV m + γt) ∂xV m+2x∂xxV m+ (∂xV
m)2
2
+
ǫ− q2
2
(mt−x)2 = 0,
(33)
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and then using the ansatz V m(t, x) = ηmt (mt − x) + Lmt (mt − x) + φmt mt + µmt , we obtain
that ηmt , L
m
t , and µ
m
t must satisfy
η˙mt = 2(a+ q)η
m
t + (η
m
t )
2 − (ǫ− q2),
L˙mt = (a+ q)L
m
t + 2η
m
t ,
φ˙mt = −2ηmt ,
µ˙mt = −
1
2
(Lmt )
2 − Lmt φmt − γtφmt ,
with terminal conditions ηmT = c, L
m
T = 0, φ
m
T = 0, and µ
m
T = 0 leading to
ηmt = ηt =
−(ǫ− q2)
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
− c
(
δ+e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − δ−
)
(
δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)− c (e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1) ,
where we again use the notation
δ± = −(a+ q)±
√
R,
with
R := (a+ q)2 + (ǫ− q2) > 0,
Lmt = Lt = −2
∫ T
t
e(a+q)(t−s)ηms ds,
φmt = φt2
∫ T
t
ηms ds,
and
µmt = µt =
∫ T
t
{
1
2
(Lms )
2 + Lms φ
m
s + γ
m
s φ
m
s
}
ds.
Hence, the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is given by
αˆt = (q + ηt)(mt −Xt)− ψt, (34)
with deposit rate ψt = −Lt ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and the corresponding dynamic Xt is driven
by
dXt = ((a+ q + ηt)(mt −Xt)− ψt + γt)dt+ 2
√
XtdWt.
We obtain that mt = E(Xt) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T written as
dmt = (γt − ψt)dt.
where we assume γt − ψt ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The ǫ-Nash equilibrium (32) is the exact
limit of the Markov equilibrium in the finite player games (23) as N → ∞. Hence, we
naturally regard the ǫ-Nash equilibrium as an asymptotic solution of the optimal strategy
for bank i written as
αˆit = (q + ηt)(X t −Xit)− ψt,
satisfying a + q + ηt ≤ N for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T in order to guarantee admissibility referring
to Proposition 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013]. The mean field limit mt simply is replaced
from the averaged capitalization Xt.
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Remark 1. The Markov Nash equilibrium and the ǫ-Nash equilibrium are also obtained
using the Dynamic programming-Carathe´odory approach. In fact, since the HJB approach
gives the equilibrium explicitly in Section 3.1, the Dynamic programming-Carathe´odory ap-
proach is treated as a verification theorem. However, in the non-Markovian case, we ap-
ply this approach to solve the equilibrium. See Alekal et al. [1971], Chen and Wu [2011],
Huang et al. [2012], and Carmona et al. for instance.
3.3 Financial Implications
This subsection is devoted to analysis of the model (10-11). We use the Markov Nash
equilibria identical to the ǫ-Nash equilibria. Given the strategy of bank i,
αit = (q + (1−
1
N
)ηct )(X t −Xit)− ψct , (35)
the dynamics of bank i are expressed as
dXit =
{
(a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηct )(X t −Xit) + γt − ψct
}
dt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t
=
a+ q + (1− 1N )ηctN
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) + γt − ψct
 dt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t , (36)
and the total monetary reserve Yt =
∑N
j=1X
i
t is
dYt = N(γt − ψct )dt+ 2
√
YtdW˜t, (37)
where W˜t is a standard Brownian motion in some extension probability space.
• According to the analysis in Section 2, we imposes the instability condition
sup
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct ) <
2
N
,
and discuss the tail probability of all defaults based on the total monetary reserve Yt
and its corresponding first passage time τ = inf{t > 0;Yt = 0}. Due to Yt driven
by the time-dependent drift, the explicit solution of tail probability P(τ > T ) is not
obtained in the literature. Therefore, we consider the estimation of the tail probability
of all defaults. To this end, define τˆ = inf{t > 0; Yˆt = 0} and τˇ = inf{t > 0; Yˇt = 0}
with corresponding dynamics
dYˆt = N sup
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct )dt+ 2
√
YˆtdW˜t,
and
dYˇt = N inf
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct )dt+ 2
√
YˇtdW˜t.
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Figure 3: Plots of ηt on the left and ψt on the right for 0 ≤ t ≤ T with a = 1, q = 1, ǫ = 2,
c = 0, N = 10, T = 1.
Applying the comparison theorem studied in Go¨ing-Jaeschkeing-Jaeschke and Yor
[2003], Ikeda and Watanabe [1977], Elworthy et al. [1999], we estimate the tail prob-
ability of all defaults as
Γ
(
Y 20
2T
;N inf
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct )
)
= P(τˇ > T )
≤ P(τ > T )
≤ P(τˆ > T ) = Γ
(
Y 20
2T
;N sup
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct )
)
, (38)
for T ≥ t where Γ(x, s) := ∫ x0 us−1e−udu for s > 0, and x ≥ 0.
• Though the rebalanced growth rate γt − ψct and the symmetric lending preference
At/N are not purely constants but deterministic homogeneous functions where
At = a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηct , (39)
we still apply Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013]. The
stochastic stability of process Xit−X t and the matrix-valued process (Xit−Xjt )1≤i,j≤N
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T can be qualified through the identity of γt − ψct and At/N .
As the results obtained in Carmona et al. [2015], the objective function (11) yields an
increasing liquidity qualified by the larger rate of lending and borrowing given by (39). The
fully symmetric lending and borrowing model leads to the Nash equilibrium independent
of the growth rate γt but according to the discussion in Section 2, the growth rate γt plays
an important role as a stabilizer for the system. In particular, due to the volatility driven
by the square root function of states written as
√
Xit , under the optimal strategy (35),
bank i intends to borrow less money from the central bank or to lend it more money. In
12
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Figure 4: Plots of ηt on the left and ψt on the right for 0 ≤ t ≤ T with a = 1, q = 1, ǫ = 2,
c = 0, N = 10, T = 100.
this way, it manipulates its own reserve through the positive deposit rate appearing in the
drift as shown in Figure 3 and 4 in order to minimize the quadratic cost with a smaller
volatility. Note that when T is large, ηct is treated as a constant and ψ
c
t increases almost
linearly with t. Hence, the central bank acts as a central deposit corporation rather than a
clearing house. However, noting that the growth rate diminishes through the deposit rate
ψct , referring to the results in Fouque and Ichiba [2013], we observe that the equilibrium
creates the possibility of all defaults. Consequently, under the stability condition
inf
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct ) >
2
N
, (40)
increasing liquidity leads to stability. However, if the system remains in the worse-case
scenario given by
sup
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct ) ≤
2
N
,
the interbank lending and borrowing system may face immediate systemic risk due to the
large liquidity. Therefore, from the regulator’s point of view, the system is stable only
when the deposit rate ψct satisfies the stability condition (42). Consequently, the regulator
must control the incentive q and the running penalty ǫ such that condition (42) and P(Yt =
0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) = 0 hold meaning that impossibility of system crash in the fixed time period.
In fact, a regulator may propose the restricted admissible set of the equilibrium written as
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
Xj,α
i
t ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, · · · , N and Y αt > 0 a.s., (41)
leading to the weaker stability condition
inf
0≤t≤T
(γt − ψct ) ≥
2
N
. (42)
As an example, we discuss the MFG case N → ∞ without lending and borrowing imposi-
tions and the terminal cost penalty that is, a = c = 0, and identify the sufficient conditions
that satisfy (42).
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Proposition 1. Given the constant growth rate γt = γ, N → ∞ and a = c = 0, if the
incentive q satisfies √
2ǫ√
γ + 2
< q ≤ √ǫ,
for fixed ǫ or if the running penalty ǫ satisfies
q2 ≤ ǫ < γ + 2
2
q2,
for fixed q, the stability condition (42) holds.
Proof. As N →∞, the deposit rate becomes ψt = −Lt. Using
δ+ = −q +√ǫ, δ− = −q −√ǫ,
and
δ+ − δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t)
= δ+ − δ− − δ−(e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1)
= (q +
√
ǫ)(e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1)
≥ q(e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1),
we obtain
ηt =
−(ǫ− q2)
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
(
δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)
≤ ǫ− q
2
q
.
and consequently
Lt = −2
∫ T
t
eq(t−s)ηsds
≥ −2ǫ− q
2
q
∫ T
t
eq(t−s)ds
= 2
ǫ− q2
q2
(
e−q(T−t) − 1
)
≥ 2
(
1− ǫ
q2
)
.
Since ψct = −Lt and γ − ψct = γ +Lt is bounded from below by γ + 2
(
1− ǫ
q2
)
, a sufficient
condition that guarantees condition (42) holds is given by
γ + 2
(
1− ǫ
q2
)
> 0
implying that for fixed ǫ, the incentive q satisfies
√
2ǫ√
γ + 2
< q ≤ √ǫ,
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or for fixed q, the running penalty ǫ satisfies
q2 ≤ ǫ < γ + 2
2
q2.
According to Proposition 1, given the running penalty ǫ, a regulator must impose a
minimum incentive q of
√
2ǫ√
γ+2
to satisfy (42) leading to the avoidance of system crash
during the fixed time period.
4 Nash Equilibria: Case of the Infinite Time Horizon
The aim of this section is to investigate the case of the infinite time horizon stochastic game.
We extend the quadratic cost proposed by Carmona et al. [2015] in the infinite time horizon
given a discount factor e−rt and a constant growth rate γ ≥ 0 and study the behavior of the
corresponding adding liquidity and deposit rate influenced by the discount rate r and the
incentive q respectively. Adopting the notations in Section 3.1, given the optimal strategies
αˆj for j 6= i, the value function of bank i is written as
V i(x) = inf
αi∈Ai
Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(Xis, Xˆ
−i
s , α
i
s)ds
}
. (43)
where
fi(Xt, α
i
t) =
(αit)
2
2
− qαit(X t −Xit) +
ǫ
2
(X t −Xit)2,
and q2 ≤ ǫ so that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α) subject to the dynamics
dXit =
 a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) + γ
 dt+ αitdt+ 2√XitdW it , i = 1, · · · , N. (44)
with the initial Xi0 = ξ
i identical to (10). Similarly, in the Markovian setting, the HJB
equation reads
−rV i + inf
αi
{∑
j 6=i
(
a(x− xj) + γ + αˆj(t, x)
)
∂xjV
i +
(
a(x− xi) + γ + αi
)
∂xiV
i
+ 2
N∑
j=1
xj∂xjxjV
i +
(αi)2
2
− qαi (x− xi)+ ǫ
2
(x− xi)2
}
= 0, (45)
where αˆj for all j 6= i represent the optimal strategies for bank j for all j 6= i. The first
order condition yields the strategy
αˆit = q(X t −Xt)− ∂xiV i,
and the solution to the value function V i is given by
V i(x) =
η
2
(x− xi)2 + L(xt − xi) + φx+ µ, (46)
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where η, L, φ, and µ satisfy
−rη = 2(a+ q)η + (1− 1
N2
)η2 − (ǫ− q2),
−rL =
(
a+ q +
1
N
(1− 1
N
)η
)
L+
1
N
(1− 1
N
)ηφ+ 2(1 − 2
N
)η,
−rφ = −2(1− 1
N
)η,
−rµ = 1
N
(1− 1
2N
)φ2 − 1
2
(1− 1
N
)2L2 − (1− 1
N
)2Lφ− γφ,
leading to the solutions
η =
ǫ− q2
(a+ q + r2) +
√
(a+ q + r2)
2 + (1− 1N2 )(ǫ− q2)
, (47)
φ =
2
r
(1− 1
N
)η, (48)
L =
1
N (
1
N − 1)ηφ+ 2( 2N − 1)η(
a+ q + r + 1N (1− 1N )η
) , (49)
and
µ =
1
2 (1− 1N )2L2 + (1− 1N )2Lφ+ γφ− 1N (1− 12N )φ2
r
. (50)
Hence, the Markov Nash equilibrium strategy αˆi is written as
αˆit =
(
q + (1− 1
N
)η
)
(X t −Xit)− ψ. (51)
The individual monetary reserve Xit and the total monetary reserve Yt =
∑N
i=1X
i
t are given
by
dXit =
{(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)η
)
(X t −Xit) + γ − ψ
}
dt+ 2
√
XitdW
i
t . (52)
and
dYt = N(γ − ψ)dt+ 2
√
YtdW˜t, (53)
where W˜t is defined in Section 2. Similarly, in order to guarantee the regularity condition
of the total monetary reserve (53) and the admissibility of the optimal strategies αˆi for
i = 1, · · · , N , using Proposition 2.1 Fouque and Ichiba [2013], we assume
0 ≤ ψ = ( 1
N
− 1)L+ 1
N
φ ≤ γ, (54)
and
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)η ≤ N. (55)
The corresponding financial interpretation is discussed in Section 3. We verify that V i and
αˆi is the solution to the problem (43-44) through Theorem 2 in Appedix A .
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Based on the results in Section 2, we now consider the re-balanced growth rate γ − ψ
as a critical value to determine the possibility of system crash. In the case of γ − ψ > 2N ,
systemic risk is always avoided. In the case of γ−ψ = 2N , banks will face a future crisis. In
the case of 0 < γ−ψ < 2N , all banks will default at some large time and the total monetary
reserve reflects at the point {0}. In the case of γ − ψ = 0, all banks will default within a
the finite time and remain at zero almost surely.
In addition, owing to homogeneity of the value function (43), we obtain the identical
growth rate γ −ψ and the symmetric lending preference A/N where A = a+ q+ (1− 1N )η.
Similarly, Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] ensure stochastic
stability of the process Xit − X t and the matrix-valued process (Xit − Xjt )1≤i,j≤N for all
t ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. For fixed a ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ 0, and the discount rate r ≥ 0, given the incentive
0 ≤ q ≤ √ǫ, the first derivative of η with respect to q is
∂qη =
−1 + a+
r
2
+ q
N2√
(a+q+ r
2
)2+(1− 1
N2
)(ǫ−q2)
1− 1
N2
< 0, 0 ≤ q ≤ √ǫ. (56)
Proof. It suffices to show
a+
r
2
+
q
N2
<
√
(a+ q +
r
2
)2 + (1− 1
N2
)(ǫ− q2),
which is equivalent to show that(
a+
r
2
+
q
N2
)2
< (a+ q +
r
2
)2 + (1− 1
N2
)(ǫ− q2).
Consequently, we obtain
(a+ q +
r
2
)2 + (1− 1
N2
)(ǫ− q2)−
(
a+
r
2
+
q
N2
)2
=
(
1− 1
N2
)(
1
N2
q2 + (2a+ r)q + ǫ
)
> 0,
for 0 ≤ q ≤ √ǫ which completes the proof.
For fixed a ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ 0, and q ≥ 0, η given by (47) is a decreasing function of r. According
to (48) and (49), we obtain
ψ = (
1
N
− 1)L+ 1
N
φ =
1
N (
1
N − 1)( 2N − 1)ηφ+ 2( 1N − 1)( 2N − 1)η + 1N (a+ q + r)φ
a+ q + r + 1N (1− 1N )η
. (57)
Inserting φ into (57) and canceling η, ψ becomes
ψ =
2( 1N − 1)( 2N − 1)
(
1
rN (1− 1N )η2 + η
)
+ 2rN (1− 1N )(a+ q + r)η
a+ q + r + 1N (1− 1N )η
.
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By Proposition 2, a large q creates a small deposit rate. In addition, observe that a large r
also suppresses the slight deposit rate. Therefore, a regulator must impose the restrictions
on both the incentive and the discount rate to satisfy stability condition ψ(q, r) < γ − 2N
and hence facilitate the avoidance of all defaults. For example, assuming N → ∞ with
a = 0, for any given r and ǫ, a regulator must impose a lower bound on the incentive q as
q >
−(14γ2 + 34γ)r +
√
(14γ
2 + 34γ)
2r2 +
(
ǫ− (14γ2 + 12γ) r2) (12γ + 1)2
(12γ + 1)
2
,
if ǫ ≥ (14γ2 + 12γ) r2 or q ≥ 0, otherwise. These constraints will ensure the stability condition
ψ(q, r) < γ − 2N and the permanent survival of the inter-bank system.
5 Conclusion
We study the linear quadratic regulator subject to the coupled CIR type diffusions. Given
some regularity conditions, the admissible Markov Nash equilibrium creates system insta-
bility since the deposit rate given by the equilibrium diminishes the individual growth rate.
A regulator must govern the growth rate of the ensemble total in order to prevent system
crash. This problem can be extended in some directions. First, the behavior of simple
lending and borrowing can be replaced with the system under relative performance concern
proposed by Espinosa and Touzi [2015]. Second, it would be interesting to study the delay
obligation based on the system referring to Carmona et al.. Due to the character of CIR
type processes, we must tackle the admissibility of the equilibrium. Third, an individual
bank may have a more restricted admissible set satisfying
Xj,α
i
t ≥ 0, ∀j 6= i and Xi,α
i
t > 0 a.s..
The explicit solution of the admissible equilibrium would be of great interest. The above
extensions are ongoing research topics.
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A Verification Theorem
Theorem 1. (Verification Theorem)
Given the optimal strategies αˆj given by (23) for all j 6= i, V i given by (16) is the value
function associated to the problem (12) subject to (10) and αˆi is the optimal strategy for
bank i and also the Markov Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by α˜ an admissible strategy obtained from the strategy αˆ = (αˆ1, · · · , αˆN ) by
replacing the i-th component by α˜i. That is,
α˜ = (αˆ1, · · · , αˆi−1, αi, αˆi+1, · · · αˆN ).
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When αt is replaced by α˜t in (10), we denote the solution by
X˜t = (X˜
1
t , X˜
2
t , · · · , X˜Nt ).
When αt is replaced by αˆt in (10), we denote the solution by
Xˆt = (Xˆ
1
t , Xˆ
2
t , · · · , XˆNt ).
We want to prove the following. For any admissible strategy α˜, we have
V i(t, x) ≤ Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi(X˜t, α
i
s)ds+ gi(X˜T )
}
. (58)
and for αˆ, we have
V i(t, x) = Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi(Xˆt, αˆ
i
s)ds+ gi(XˆT )
}
, (59)
Using (58) and (59) implies that αˆi is an optimal strategy for i-th bank when other banks
use αˆj , j 6= i as their strategies. We first consider (58) and (10) for αt = α˜t. We can assume
that
Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi(X˜t, α
i
s)ds
}
<∞, (60)
otherwise, (58) holds automatically. Define the exit time
θM = inf{t; |X˜t| ≥M}.
Under (60), we shall prove the following properties:
P (θM ≤ T )→ 0, M →∞. (61)
and
Et,x[ max
t≤s≤T
|X˜s|2] <∞. (62)
We postpone the proof of (61) and (62). We now prove (58).
Given αˆj by (23) for all j 6= i, applying Ito´’s formula on V i(s, X˜s), we obtain
dV i(s, X˜s)
=
{
∂sV
i(s, X˜s) +
∑
j 6=i
(
a(X˜s − X˜js ) + γs + αˆjs(s, X˜s)
)
∂xjV
i(s, X˜s)
+
(
a(X˜s − X˜is) + γs + α˜is
)
∂xiV
i(s, X˜s) + 2
N∑
j=1
X˜js∂xjxjV
i(s, X˜s)
}
ds
+
N∑
j=1
2
√
X˜js∂xjV
i(s, X˜s)dW
j
s ,
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and then
V i(T ∧ θM , X˜T∧θM )
= V i(t, x) +
∫ T∧θM
t
{
∂sV
i(s, X˜s) +
∑
j 6=i
(
a(X˜s − X˜js ) + γs + αˆjs(s, X˜s)
)
∂xjV
i(s, X˜s)
+
(
a(X˜s − X˜is) + γs + α˜is
)
∂xiV
i(s, X˜s) + 2
N∑
j=1
X˜js∂xjxjV
i(s, X˜s)
}
ds
+
∫ T∧θM
t
N∑
j=1
2
√
X˜js∂xjV
i(s, X˜s)dW
j
s .
Taking the expectation on both sides and using
∂tV
i +
∑
j 6=i
(
a(x− xj) + γt + αˆj
)
∂xjV
i +
(
a(x− xi) + γt + αi
)
∂xiV
i
+2
N∑
j=1
xj∂xjxjV
i +
(αi)2
2
− qαi (x− xi)+ ǫ
2
(x− xi)2 ≥ 0 (63)
give
V i(t, x) ≤ E
{∫ T∧θM
t
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds
+V i(T ∧ θM , X˜T∧θM )
}
.. (64)
(62) implies V i(T ∧ θM ,XT∧θM ) is uniformly integrable, since
|V i(T ∧ θM , X˜T∧θM )| ≤ c(1 + sup
t≤s≤T
|X˜s|2).
Together with (61), we obtain as M →∞
Et,x[V
i(T ∧ θM , X˜T∧θM )]→ Et,x[g(X˜T )].
We note
E
{∫ T∧θM
t
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds
}
≤ E
{∫ T
t
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds
}
,
since the integrand is nonnegative. Putting the above results together, we can obtain
V i(t, xt) ≤ E
{∫ T
t
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds + g(X˜T ))
}
. (65)
This completes the proof of (58).
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We now prove (61). Recall
Y˜t = X˜
1
t + X˜
2
t ++ · · ·+ X˜Nt = NX˜t.
The monetary reserve X˜it is given
dX˜it =
(
a(
1
N
Y˜t − X˜it) + γt + αit
)
dt+ 2
√
X˜itdW
i
t , (66)
and given αˆjt for j 6= i, the total monetary reserve Y˜t is governed by
dY˜t = (Nγt +
∑
j 6=i
αˆjt + α
i
t)dt++2
√
Y˜tdW˜t,
where
dW˜t =
1√
Y˜t
N∑
j=1
√
X˜jt dW
j
t
is a Brownian motion and
dX˜it · dY˜t = 4X˜itdt.
Using (28), we have∑
j 6=i
αˆj = −(N − 1)ψct − (q + (1−
1
N
)ηct )(X˜ t − X˜it)
= −(N − 1)ψct − (q + (1−
1
N
)ηct )(
1
N
Y˜t − X˜it).
The equation for Y˜t becomes
dY˜t = (Nγt − (N − 1)ψct − (q + (1−
1
N
)ηct )(
1
N
Y˜t − X˜it) + αit)dt++2
√
Y˜tdW˜t.
Note that X˜it ≥ 0 leads to Y˜t ≥ X˜jt for j = 1, · · · , N and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , since αi is admissible
implies X˜jt ≥ 0 for all j and for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Applying Itoˆ fomula to Y˜ 2t +(X˜it)2, we have
d(Y˜ 2t + (X˜
i
t)
2) = (a(t)(Y˜t)
2 + b(t)Y˜tX˜
i
t + c(t)(X˜
i
t)
2 + (d(t) + 2αit)Y˜t + (e(t) + 2α
i
t)X˜
i
t)dt
+4Y˜t
√
Y˜tdW˜t + 4X˜
i
t
√
X˜itdW
i
t , (67)
where
a(t) = −2 1
N
(q + (1− 1
N
)ηct ), b(t) = 2(q + (1−
1
N
)ηct ) + 2a
1
N
,
c(t) = −2a, d(t) = 2(Nγt − (N − 1)ψct + 2), e(t) = (2γt + 4).
We take β > 0 large enough such that
β ≥ 2 sup
0≤t≤T
{|a(t)| + |b(t)|+ |c(t)|+ |d(t)| + |e(t)|+ 1},
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and then consider e−βt(Y˜ 2t + (X˜
i
t)
2) written as
e−βt(Y˜ 2t + (X˜
i
t)
2) = {−β(Y˜ 2t + (X˜it)2)) + a(t)(Y˜t)2 + b(t)Y˜tX˜it + c(t)(X˜it )2 + (d(t) + 2αit)Y˜t
+(e(t) + 2αit))X˜
i
t}e−βtdt+ e−βt(4Y˜t
√
Y˜tdW˜t + 4X˜
i
t
√
X˜itdW
i
t )
≤ {−1
2
β(Y˜ 2t + (X˜
i
t)
2 − 1) + |αit|2}e−βtdt+ e−βt(4Y˜t
√
Y˜tdW˜t + 4X˜
i
t
√
X˜itdW
i
t ),
leading to
e−β(t∧θM )(Y˜ 2t∧θM + (X˜
i)2t∧θM )
≤ (Y˜ 20 + (X˜i0)2) +
β
2
t+
∫ t∧θM
0
e−βs|αis|2ds−
β
2
∫ t∧θM
0
e−βs(Y˜ 2s + (X˜
i
s)
2)ds
+
∫ t∧θM
0
e−βt(4Y˜t
√
Y˜tdW˜t + 4X˜
i
t
√
X˜itdW
i
t ).
Taking expectation on both sides gives
e−βtM2P(θM ≤ t) ≤ Y˜ 20 +(X˜i0)2+
β
2
t+E[
∫ t
0
|αis|2ds]−
β
2
E[
∫ t∧θM
0
e−βs(Y˜ 2s +(X˜
i
s)
2)ds]. (68)
Take t = T , as M →∞, we have (61). The above relation also implies
β
2
E[
∫ T∧θM
0
e−βs(Y˜ 2s + (X˜
i
s)
2)ds] ≤ Y˜ 20 + (X˜i0)2 +
β
2
T + E[
∫ T
0
|αis|2ds]
This is true for any M . By letting M →∞ and using (61), we obtain
β
2
E[
∫ T
0
e−βs(Y˜ 2s + (X˜
i
s)
2)ds] ≤ Y˜ 20 + (X˜i0)2 +
β
2
T + E[
∫ T
0
|αis|2ds]. (69)
We are ready to prove (62). Applying Doob’s martingale inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality to (66), we get
E sup
t≤s≤T
|X˜is|2 ≤ 2E
[∫ T
t
(
a(
1
N
|Y˜s|+ |X˜is|) + γs
)
ds
]2
+2E
[∫ T
t
|αis|ds
]2
+ 2E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
(∫ T
t
2
√
X˜isds
)2]
≤ C1TE
∫ T
t
(|Y˜s|2 + |X˜is|2 + |γs|2 + |αis|2)ds+ C2E
[∫ T
t
X˜isds
]
<∞
where C1 and C2 are two positive constants. Here in the last step, we use (69). This proves
(62).
In the following, we want to show αˆi is an admissible strategy for the i-th bank and its
value is given by V i(t, x). Hence it is an optimal strategy. In this case, given αˆj for j 6= i,
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the monetary reserve for i-th bank is Xˆit which is governed by the equation
dXˆit =
(
(a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηct )(
1
N
Yˆt − Xˆit) + γt − ψct
)
dt+ 2
√
XˆitdW
i
t
=
a+ q + (1− 1N )ηct
N
N∑
j=1
(Xˆjt − Xˆit) + γt − ψct
 dt+ 2√XˆitdW it , (70)
the total monetary reserve Y˜t is written as
dYˆt = N(γt − ψct )dt++2
√
YˆtdW˜t,
where
dW˜t =
1√
Yˆt
N∑
j=1
√
Xˆjt dW
j
t
is a Brownian motion. Under the conditions (26) and (27), according to the Proposition 2.1
in Fouque and Ichiba [2013], we have Xˆit ≥ 0 almost surely for i = 1, · · · , N . This implies
the admissibility of the strategy αˆ and the regularity of the total monetary reserve Yˆt. Using
the above argument ( for the estimates of Y˜t, X˜
i
t), we can show, for a suitable β > 0,
E[
∫ T
0
e−βsYˆ 2s ds] <∞,
by considering the Ito’s formula for Yˆ 2s (see (67)). Then we can also show,
E[ sup
0≤s≤T
|Xˆis|2] <∞.
Then as (65), we can derive
V i(t, x) = E[
∫ T
t
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαˆis( ¯ˆXs − Xˆis) +
ǫ
2
(
¯ˆ
Xs − Xˆis)2)ds+ g(XˆT )].
That is, αˆi is an optimal strategy for i-th bank when αˆj , j 6= i are used for j-th bank. The
proof is complete.
Theorem 2. Given the optimal strategies αˆj written as (51) for all j 6= i, V i and αˆi given
by (46) and (51) respectively are the value function and the corresponding optimal strategy
which is also the Markov Nash equilibrium associated to the problem (43-44).
Proof. Adopting the notations in Theorem 1, denote α˜ as an admissible strategy written as
α˜ = (αˆ1, · · · , αˆi−1, αi, αˆi+1, · · · αˆN ).
Similarly, when αt is replaced by α˜t in (10), the solution is written as
X˜t = (X˜
1
t , X˜
2
t , · · · , X˜Nt ),
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and when αt is replaced by αˆt in (10), the solution is given by
Xˆt = (Xˆ
1
t , Xˆ
2
t , · · · , XˆNt ).
We again need to verify that for any admissible strategy α˜, the solution V i satisfies
V i(t, x) ≤ Et,x
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(X˜t, αis)ds
}
, (71)
and for αˆ.
V i(t, x) = Et,x
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(Xˆt, αˆis)ds
}
, (72)
The equations (71) and (72) lead to αˆi is an optimal strategy for i-th bank given αˆj for
j 6= i as their strategies. For the proof of (71), we can assume that
Et,x
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(X˜t, αis)ds
}
<∞, (73)
otherwise, (58) holds automatically. Define the exit time
θM = inf{t; |X˜t| ≥M},
or θM = +∞ if Xt never exit for all t ≥ 0. Given the optimal strategies αˆj written as (51)
for all j 6= i, using Ito´’s formula on e−rtV i, we obtain
e−rT∧θMV i(X˜T∧θM )
= V i(x) +
∫ T∧θM
0
e−rs
{
− rV i(X˜s) +
∑
j 6=i
(
a(X˜s − X˜js ) + γ + αˆjs
)
∂xjV
i(X˜s)
+
(
a(X˜s − X˜is) + γ + αis
)
∂xiV
i(X˜s) + 2
N∑
j=1
X˜js∂xjxjV
i(X˜s)
}
ds
+
∫ T∧θM
t
e−rs
N∑
i=1
2
√
X˜js∂xjV
i(X˜s)dW
j
s . (74)
Taking the expectation of both sides and using
−rV i +
∑
j 6=i
(
a(x− xj) + γ + αˆj
)
∂xjV
i +
(
a(x− xi) + γ + αi
)
∂xiV
i
+2
N∑
j=1
xj∂xjxjV
i +
(αi)2
2
− qαi (x− xi)+ ǫ
2
(x− xi)2 ≥ 0 (75)
give
V i(x) ≤ E
{∫ T∧θM
0
e−rs
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds
+e−rT∧θMV i(X˜T∧θM )
}
.
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Using the ansatz V i given by (46) gives
V i(X˜T∧θM ) ≤ K(1 + sup
0≤t≤T
|X˜t|2).
Hence, according to the results in Theorem 1, when taking the limit as M →∞, we get the
uniform integrability of V i.
V i(x) ≤ E
{∫ T
0
e−rs
(
(αis)
2
2
− qαis
(
X˜s − X˜is
)
+
ǫ
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2
)
ds+ e−rTV i(X˜T )
}
. (76)
Referring to Chapter III.9 in Fleming and Soner [2006], using φ+L > 0, we obtain V i ≥ 0
satisfying
lim supT→∞e
−rT
EV i(XˆT ) ≥ 0, (77)
leading to
V (x) ≥ Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(Xˆs, αis)ds
}
.
We now need to verify
lim infT→∞e−rTEV i(X˜T ) = 0, (78)
implying
V i(x) ≤ Ex
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtfi(X˜s, αis)ds
}
.
Recalling
V i(X˜s) =
η
2
(X˜s − X˜is)2 + L(X˜s − X˜is) + φX˜s + µ,
since
fi(X˜s, α
i
s) ≥ (ǫ− q2)(X˜s − X˜is)2,
fi(X˜s, α
i
s) ≥
1
2
(1− q
2
ǫ
)α2s,
and
E[
∫ ∞
0
e−rsfi(X˜s, αis)ds] <∞,
we have
E[
∫ T
0
e−rs(X˜s − X˜is)2ds] <∞,
and
E[
∫ T
0
e−rs(αs)2ds] <∞,
implying
lim inf
T→∞
e−rTE[(X˜T − X˜iT )2] = 0.
We need to show
lim
T→∞
e−rTE[X˜T ] = 0.
25
Since
dY˜t = (Nγ − (N − 1)ψ − (q + (1− 1
N
)η)(X˜ t − X˜it) + αit)dt+ 2
√
Y˜tdW˜t,
where W˜ is a Brownian motion (see the argument in Theorem 1), we have
E[Y˜T ] = E[Y˜0] + (Nγ − (N − 1)ψ)T − (q + (1− 1
N
)η)
∫ T
0
E[(X˜s − X˜is)ds] +
∫ T
0
E[αis]ds.
Then
e−rTE[
∫ T
0 |X˜s − X˜is|ds]
= e−rTE[
∫ T
0 e
r
2
se−
r
2
s|X˜s − X˜is|ds]
≤ e−rT (∫ T0 ersds)1/2(E[∫ T0 e−rs|X˜s − X˜is|2ds])1/2
≤ 1√
r
e−
1
2
rT (E[
∫ T
0 e
−rs|X˜s − X˜is|2ds])1/2
→ 0, T →∞.
Similarly,
e−rTE[
∫ T
0
|αis|ds]→ 0, T →∞.
Since Y˜T = NX˜T , putting the above results together, we can obtain
lim
T→∞
e−rTE[X˜T ] = 0.
Hence, the above results gives (78).
Finally, referring to Proposition 2.1 Fouque and Ichiba [2013], the conditions (54) and
(55) give the regularity condition of the total monetary reserve (53) and the admissibility
of the optimal strategies αˆi for i = 1, · · · , N . This proves that V i is the value function and
αˆi is an optimal strategy.
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